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Clark Cty. Sch. Dist. v. Richardson Constr., 123 Nev. Adv. Op. 39
(Oct. 4, 2007) 1
CIVIL PROCEDURE – STATUTORY DAMAGES AND SANCTIONS
Summary
Appeal from judgment awarding $225,000 to Richardson Construction and order
imposing sanctions upon Clark County School District (hereinafter “CCSD”).
Disposition/Outcome
Remanded. The Nevada Supreme Court held that (1) NRS 41.035 limited Richardson’s
claim of tortuous interference to the $50,000 statutory cap on tort damages against Nevada and
its political subdivisions, and (2) while the district court was proper in imposing sanctions upon
CCSD, it subsequently applied the sanctions in an overly broad manner, which was error.
Factual and Procedural History
CCSD hired Richardson Construction to construct improvements to the school district’s
food service facilities. When construction was complete, a subcontractor filed a complaint
against Richardson for unpaid amounts due for its work. Subsequently, Richardson brought a
third-party complaint against CCSD for various claims, including indemnity, contribution, and
wrongful interference with a prospective business advantage. The third-party complaint is the
subject of this suit.
During discovery, Richardson was late in producing its expert’s report on delay damages
allegedly caused by CCSD. CCSD filed a motion in limine to exclude the expert’s report.
CCSD argued it did not have sufficient time to prepare a defense against the claim of delayed
damages.
At the hearing on CCSD’s motion, Richardson argued that its expert’s report was late
because CCSD had not produced documents needed to complete the report, including a file from
CCSD employee Dan McPartlin (hereinafter “McPartlin”). McPartlin provided an affidavit
which stated that no other material existed regarding the subject matter of the lawsuit that had
not already been provided. The district court relied on this affidavit and found that CCSD was
not responsible for delaying Richardson’s expert’s report. Thus, the court granted CCSD’s
motion to exclude the expert’s testimony on delay damages.
However, conflict arose during trial because McPartlin testified that he possessed a file
which had not been given to the parties’ attorneys. McPartlin stated that he did not think the file
contained anything that had not already been produced during discovery. The court ordered
McPartlin to produce the file, which contained nearly 1,700 documents. The court then held a
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hearing to determine whether and how to sanction CCSD for not producing the documents
earlier.
After considering conflicting testimonies of Richard Prato, a CCSD attorney, and
McPartlin at the sanctions hearing, the district court issued sanctions against CCSD. The court
found that of the 1,700 documents McPartlin produced, 500 to 700 of them had not been
previously produced by CCSD. Therefore, the court determined that in addition to CCSD
producing documents late, McPartlin had issued a false affidavit. Among other sanctions not at
issue in this case, the court struck all of CCSD’s affirmative defenses, stating that “[CCSD] will
not be able to raise any facts or issues relative to their affirmative defenses.” 2
During the remainder of the trial, the district court prevented CCSD from presenting
evidence on any of its affirmative defenses. The court did so without analyzing whether the
evidence was offered in support of an affirmative defense or if it was offered to rebut
Richardson’s prima facie case. To prevent the jury from considering earlier admitted evidence
related to CCSD’s affirmative defenses, the court also approved three limiting jury instructions.
The jury returned a verdict in Richardson’s favor, awarding it (among other damages)
$225,000 for CCSD’s wrongful interference with a prospective business advantage and $500,000
on its claims for contribution and indemnification. CCSD moved for a new trial, but soon
thereafter requested that the district court summarily deny the motion, which the court did.
CCSD then appealed from the judgment and from the order denying its new trial motion.
Although the Nevada Supreme Court dismissed the appeal from the order denying a new trial, it
permitted CCSD to proceed with its appeal from the district court’s judgment entered upon the
jury verdict.
Discussion
1. Statutory Limitation on Tort Damages Under NRS 41.035
CCSD asserted that the district court erred in upholding the jury’s verdict of $225,000 on
Richardson’s tortious inference claim because NRS 41.035 puts a statutory limitation of $50,000
on tort damages awarded against political subdivisions. Richardson argued that CCSD waived
any such limitation by failing to assert it as a defense.
The Court concluded that the statutory limitation could not be waived because under the
doctrine of sovereign immunity, Nevada and all its political subdivisions received blanket
immunity from tort liability. 3 Despite this blanket immunity, the legislature has waived this
immunity on a limited basis, 4 and included a limitation permitting a party to recover up to
$50,000 against such Nevada institutions. 5 The statutory cap functions automatically as a
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damage limitation up to $50,000 in tort recovery against Nevada and its political subdivisions.
Thus, CCSD did not have a duty to assert the damage limitation as an affirmative defense.
Richardson further asserted that the $225,000 award was proper because CCSD engaged
in five separate instances of tortious interference. However, the $50,000 cap applies on a perperson, per-claim basis. 6 “Claim” means “cause of action” 7 – not each instance of the wrong.
Richardson’s third-party complaint stated only one cause of action for tortious interference
against CCSD. Therefore, the Court concluded that the jury’s verdict of $225,000 for tortious
interference with a prospective business advantage must be capped according to NRS 41.035.
The Court remanded the case to district court and ordered that if the jury found for Richardson
on this claim, the court could not award more than $50,000.
2. District Court Error in Applying its Sanction Order
CCSD argued that the district court erred in applying its sanction order because the court
did not only preclude evidence related to CCSD’s affirmative defenses, but also all evidence
needed to defend against Richardson’s prima facie case, effectively striking CCSD’s entire
answer. The Nevada Supreme Court concluded that while the district court’s sanction of striking
CCSD’s affirmative defenses was appropriate, the court’s application of its sanction order
effectively defaulted CCSD because not all of CCSD’s stated affirmative defenses were, in fact,
affirmative defenses under NRCP 8(c). Therefore, the district court abused its discretion in
applying the sanction order.
Under NRCP 37(b)(2), a district court has discretion to sanction a party for failure to
comply with a discovery order. In this case there was substantial evidence to support the district
court’s decision to sanction CCSD by striking CCSD’s affirmative defenses. McPartlin signed
an affidavit stating that all pertinent files had been produced. The affidavit was false because
there existed one file containing 500 to 700 documents that had not been previously produced, as
required under the NRCP 16.1 production provisions. Therefore, the district court did not abuse
its discretion in striking CCSD’s affirmative defenses as a sanction.
However, in applying the sanction, the district court abused its discretion by striking
more than CCSD’s affirmative defenses because this sanction effectively struck CCSD’s entire
answer. Not all of CCSD’s stated affirmative defenses were true NRCP 8(c) affirmative
defenses. 8 Some of the purported affirmative defenses were merely defenses to Richardson’s
prima facie case. Although NRCP 8(c) enumerates many affirmative defenses, to find which of
CCSD’s stated affirmative defenses were “true” affirmative defenses under NRCP 8(c) the Court
had to determine which defenses fell under its “catchall” provision. Thus, the Court adopted the
test used by federal courts – allegations must be pleaded as affirmative defenses if they raise
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“new facts and arguments that, if true, will defeat the plaintiff’s . . . claim, even if all allegations
are true.” 9
The Court addressed each of CCSD’s stated affirmative defenses and applied its newly
adopted test. The Court determined that the following defenses raised new facts and arguments
that, if proven, would defeat Richardson’s claim and were thus true affirmative defenses:
mitigation of damages, failure of Richardson to fulfill conditions precedent, breach of covenant
of good faith and fair dealing, and waiver. Since these were all NRCP 8(c) affirmative defenses,
the district court properly precluded CCSD from presenting evidence related to them. However,
CCSD did not need to plead the remaining stated defenses affirmatively. These defenses are as
follows: failure to state a claim, 10 Richardson’s damages were caused by others, 11 Richardson’s
damages are speculative, 12 and CCSD performed under the contract. 13 Since these defenses
were not true affirmative defenses, the district court abused its discretion by precluding evidence
related to them.
Conclusion
CCSD could not waive its statutory damages protection under NRS 41.035, but the
district court erred in its application of sanctions against CCSD. Any tort damages awarded must
be limited to $50,000, even though CCSD did not raise its immunity under NRS 41.035 in its
answer. The Court affirmed the district court’s decision to impose sanctions against CCSD, but
concluded that the district court applied the sanction in an overly broad manner. The sanctions
precluded all evidence that CCSD presented relating to all CCSD’s stated affirmative defenses,
although not all of the defenses were true affirmative defenses under NRCP 8(c). Accordingly,
the Court reversed the district court’s judgment upon the jury verdict and remanded for a new
trial on the tort and contract claims consistent with its opinion.
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